YWR: Your Weekend Reading

YWR: Your Weekend Reading

YWR: A Private Equity Train Smash Update

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Erik
Oct 07, 2025
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Last year in Anatomy of a Private Equity Train Smash we made a bold call.

That private equity would be the worst asset class of the next 10 years.

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Today we build on that view with the 2024 year end data plus new insights on the state pension fund industry from Equable.

But it’s not all bad.

The Harvard Management Company tips us off to the best performing asset class of the next 10 years.

But we get to that at the end.

  • The Set Up

  • 2024 Data Update

  • Stay away from people who are drowning.

  • Harvard’s Asset Class for the Future

The Set-Up

There’s a dirty secret in asset management.

You raise money when you can. Not when you should.

Investors don’t come in at the bottom when risk/reward is fantastic and you are begging them for a meeting. Nope.

They come in 10 years later at the top when valuations are peak, and the trend is already over. The nice thing though is that at the top you don’t beg for meetings. People you’ve never hear of come out of the woodwork and find you.

Figure 11: Deal multiples remain at or near record levels in North America 
and Europe 
North America 
Western Europe 
Median total enterprise value 
Median TEV/EBITDA multiple 
(TEV)/EBITDA multiple 
15x 
15x 
11.9x 
12.1x 
10 
Change in 
10 
Change in 
TEV/EBITDA 
TEV/EBITDA 
multiple 
multiple 
2024 vs. 
2024 vs. 
5 
2023 
5 
2023 
7% 
5% 
2024 vs. 
2024 vs. 
5-yr. avg. 
5-yr. avg. 
0 
3% 
0 
11% 
2004 08 
12 
16 
20 
24 
2004 08 12 
16 
20 
24 
Note: Data as of September 30, 2024 
Source: SPI by StepStone

And you feel bad that they’re coming in when the move is over and the risk is to the downside. But for business reasons you smile and wave them in. Yup. Collect the management fees, put a brave face on it and hope the downside isn’t too bad (for them).

Which is why when $3.5 trillion piled into PE/VC in 2021-2022 after over 10 years of stellar returns, at record deal valuations, we expected the future would be awful. That over the next 10 years PE and VC would be a multi-year torture chamber with investors begging for their money back the whole time.

2024 Data

It’s only been a year, but what’s the update?

We now have the 2024 data and we see that as expected investor enthusiasm to put new money into private equity declined further with only $1.1 trillion of capital raised.

Figure 24: Global private fund-raising declined for a third straight year, with only 
two asset classes avoiding the slide 
Global private capital raised, by fund type 
$2.0T 
-15% 
1.8 
1.7 
-24% 
1.5 
1.4 
1.4 
1.4 
2024 vs. 2024 vs. 
2023 5-yr. avg. 
1.3 
1.1 
1.2 
Other 
-55% 
-63% 
1.1 
Distressed PE 
-31% 
-46% 
1.0 
Infrastructure 
0% 
-31% 
0.7 
0.8 
| Secondaries 
-37% 
6% 
0.7 
0.7 
I Direct lending 
3% 
6% 
0.5 
0.6 
| Venture capital -23% 
-57% 
0.5 
0.5 
0.3 0.4 
Growth 
-23% 
-35% 
0.4 
0.3 
Real estate 
-29% 
-46% 
0.2 
Buyout 
-23% 
-11% 
0.0 
Total 
-24% 
-30% 
2004 06 08 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 20 22 24 
Close year 
Notes: Includes closed-end and commingled funds only; buyout category includes buyout, balanced, 
coinvestment, and coinvestment multimanager fund types; includes funds with final close and represents the year 
in which they held their final close; excludes SoftBank Vision Fund; other category includes fund of funds and 
mezzanine and excludes natural resources 
Source: Preqin
Source: Bain Private Equity Report 2025

Remember, this is an asset class highly sensitive to flows. Reduced inflows and tighter liquidity puts pressure on stated valuations, which PE firms work to smooth as best they can. Because that’s a lot of what they are selling you. A managed P&L. Less money coming into the system, also makes it more challenging to exit. Kind of like African FX.

And about getting your money back…. that was already a problem in 2022 and 2023. Did it get better in 2024?

Distributions were +34% in $ terms, to $468bn, but given the larger fund sizes of the funds it’s historically low returns as % of AUM.

It starts with a simple statement: With the exception of a spike in 2021, the amount of capital returned to investors is not keeping pace with the industry’s increasing scale. While global buyout AUM has tripled over the past decade, distributions as a percentage of NAV have fallen from an average of 29% from 2014 to 2017 to 11% today. Bain Private Equity Report 2025

The low level of asset sales that we did see involved a record level of sales to other private equity funds (Sponsor to Sponsor).

Figure 14: A strong rebound in sponsor-to-sponsor deals helped pull the exit 
market out of its two-year slide 
Global buyout-backed exit value, by channel 
- Exit count 
$1,000B 
3,000 
855 
800 
2,000 
600 
548 476 
508 
434 
594 
468 
358 
416 412 
350 
400 
262 
363 
251 233 
164 
283 
254 281 
1,000 
200 
73 
0 
0 
2005 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
Change in exit value 
2024 vs. 2023 
2024 vs. 5-yr. avg. 
IPO 
84% 
-46% 
Sponsor to sponsor 
141% 
26% 
Sponsor to strategic 
0% 
-27% 
Total 
34% 
-15%
Source: Bain Private Equity Report 2025

In Sponsor to Sponsor you are selling to another PE fund or maybe a Secondary Opportunity Fund set up by your own GP to take advantage of your liquidity problems.

How wonderful. Thank you.

Buying your assets at a discount is a thriving new asset class for PE Managers. But it kind of sucks if you are the pension fund in the original funds.

And how about the ‘IRR’s’? That highly manipulated and misleading calculation of return. The final IRR will depend on the how the investments turn out, but already the years 2020-2022, when all the money came in, are on track to be the worst vintages ever. 2020-2022 resembles 2005-2006. A quick drawdown of capital and then a long payback period.

Figure 19: Drawdowns from recent fund vintages are mirroring those from 
2005-06, raising the specter of delayed payback to investors 
Global buyout net cash flow per $100 commitment, by vintage year 
$100 
- 2005-06 Vintages before the 
global financial crisis 
(GFC) had fast initial 
drawdowns, and the 
50 
ensuing recession 
delayed payback periods 
2010-15 Post-GFC vintages were 
less volatile, with slower 
drawdowns and shorter 
0 
payback periods 
About 1.5 years 
-2016-19 
Pre-Covid-era vintages 
longer to return 
had fast drawdowns and 
capital than 
short payback periods 
-50 
post-GFC vintages 
- 2020-22 Covid-era vintages had 
Stalled exits/ 
fast initial drawdowns as 
distributions 
market activity boomed 
Faster drawdowns 
and larger 
but slow distributions 
-100 
for 2020-22 vintages 
cash outlays 
due to stalled exits 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
Year of fund life 
Note: Data through Q3 2024 
Sources: MSCI; Bain analysis
Source: Bain Private Equity Report 2025

And what about IPO’s? The market’s hot. Can’t those happen?

IPO’s have been surprisingly difficult. Well, not surprising. Nobody wants to be the bag holder for the PE funds.

1. There’s been a complete narrative shift since 2022. If you want to IPO Spacex, Anduril or Anthropic maybe that could be interesting. Otherwise, nobody in public markets wants a boomer pre-AI SaaS company, a dental practice roll-up, or a warehouse logistics company.

Blackstone Credit (BCRED) loans… a window into boring PE investments.
  1. There are few humans with money left in public markets to look at deals. Active managers are getting outflows non-stop to passive and ETF’s. Hedge funds aren’t getting inflows either. Although a pod podshop ECM desk might give you a few million if the deal is hot and they can flip it. Again, has to be hot. No dental practices or logistics companies.

How about performance? Has it been a train smash?

The trailing 3 years have averaged 4.4% for the PE index with caveat #1 that this is highly dependent on which vintage and manager you own, and caveat #2 that much of this performance is determined by the PE funds themselves. Like scoring your own test.

FIGURE 1 US PRIVATE EQUITY AND VENTURE CAPITAL INDEX RETURNS 
Periods Ended December 31, 2024 . Percent (%) 
Index 
6 Mo 
1 Yr 
3 Yr 
5 Yr 
10 Yr 
15 Yr 
20 Yr 
25 Yr 
CA US Private Equity* 
4.6 
8.1 
4.4 
15.8 
15.1 
16.0 
13.9 
12.1 
Russell 2000® mPME 
9.7 
11.5 
2.6 
7.9 
8.0 
11.1 
8.3 
8.3 
S&P 500 mPME 
8.5 
25.0 
10.0 
15.0 
13.3 
14.1 
10.7 
9.1 
CA US Venture Capital 
4.7 
6.2 
-6.4 
15.1 
13.7 
14.8 
11.9 
8.0 
Nasdaq Constructed ** mPME 
9.3 
29.4 
9.0 
17.9 
16.2 
16.5 
12.7 
9.6 
Russell 2000® mPME 
9.6 
11.5 
2.3 
7.6 
7.9 
10.8 
8.1 
8.2 
S&P 500 mPME 
8.4 
24.8 
9.7 
14.7 
13.2 
14.0 
10.6 
8.9 
Nasdaq Composite *** AACR 
9.3 
29.6 
8.1 
17.5 
16.2 
16.5 
12.6 
7.3 
Russell 2000® AACR 
9.6 
11.5 
1.2 
7.4 
7.8 
10.3 
7.8 
7.6 
S&P 500 AACR 
8.4 
25.0 
8.9 
14.5 
13.1 
13.9 
10.4 
7.7 
* Includes US buyout and growth equity funds only. ** Constructed Index: Data from 1/1/1986 to 10/31/2003 
represented by Nasdaq Price Index. Data from 11/1/2003 to present represented by Nasdaq Composite. *** Capital 
change only. 
Sources: Cambridge Associates LLC, Frank Russell Company, FTSE International Limited, Nasdaq, Standard & Poor's, and 
Thomson Reuters Datastream. Third-party data provided "as is" without any express or implied warranties. 
Notes: Past performance is not a reliable indicator of future results. All financial investments involve risk. Depending 
on the type of investment, losses can be unlimited.

Even so, 4.4% is not a train smash. If that is the extent of the train smash, then private equity looks pretty good.

But there are reasons to think we are not out of the woods and things can still get worse.

Stay away from people who are drowning.

You know how they tell you to stay away from people who are drowning? Throw them a life preserver, but don’t let them grab your arm and pull you down with them. To me that’s PE.

The problem is two of the biggest PE investors, endowments and pension funds, have cash flow problems. They are highly allocated to an illiquid asset class with large operating cash flow needs.

Harvard’s Endowment for example is 44% allocated to PE and Real Estate with the distributions from the endowment funding 40% of the operating budget.

Twenty years ago, Harvard’s endowment distributions accounted for 21% of the University’s budget. Ten years later, it had grown to 31%. Now, it is approaching 40%. The ever-increasing reliance on this critical resource makes our work all the more important. Source: HMC 2024 Report.

Max allocated to PE with no flexibility on cash flow distributions to the university. Princeton and Yale are the same. Stanford is a bit better (21% of the university budget).

This combination of high payouts to the university, with low PE returns is making it hard to grow the endowment. The CAGR for actual growth of the endowment in $ terms for the 4 of them together is 0.6% since 2022. In a bull market.

It’s a fragile situation, because if we ever get into a real bear market, these endowments will get into a negative spiral where they are continually eating into their principal. This would mean more pressure on the GP’s to sell assets to create liquidity.

Public pension funds, another big PE client, are the same. Underfunded and over allocated to an illiquid asset class. Although not as extreme as the endowments, pension funds have also been steadily increasing their exposure to private equity.

VALUATION RISK: SHARE OF "VALUATION PRICED" ASSETS 
COMPARED TO "MARKET PRICED" ASSETS 
$6.0 
25.6% 
30% 
Share of Pension Fund Assets 
$5.0 
Based on Valuation Prices 
"Valuation Priced" Assets 
25% 
(Private Capital, Real Estate) 
$1.4T 
$4.0 
'Market Priced" Assets 
(Public Equities, Fixed Income) 
20% 
$3.0 
15% 
$4.1T 
$ Trillions 
$2.0 
10% 
Share of Assets in Alternatives 
$1.0 
5% 
$0.0 
0% 
2012 
2014 
2005 
2008 
2009 
2013 
2015 
2016 
2023 
2024 
2001 
2002 
2004 
2011 
2017 
2019 
2020 
2006 
2007 
2022 
2003 
2010 
2018 
2021 
Source: Equable Institute analysis of public plan valuation reports and ACFRs. 
Note: "Valuation Priced" investments include assets defined by public plans as private equity, private debt, real estate, or hedge fund. 
EQUABLE
Source: Equable State of Pensions 2025

Maybe 26% allocated to private assets is not extreme. But like the endowments they have cash flow issues. State pension funds are underfunded by $1.35 trillion with a growing ratio of beneficiaries to active members. This means the plans are all cash flow negative every year. They need PE distributions to pay member benefits. There is no flexibility around this.

Cash Flow for Statewide Pension Plans, 2001-2024 
Total Benefits 
Member Contributions 
Employer Contributions 
Net Cash Flow 
$200B 
-200B 
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Source: Equable.

Interestingly, Equable also describes the situation for state pension funds as ‘fragile’.

So if you had fresh capital and were trying to figure out an attractive asset class to invest in for the next 10 years would you want to get involved in this situation? Co-invested with endowments and pension funds struggling for cash.

Or, would you prefer an asset class where investors have already exited and money is flowing in, instead of out?

Here again we thank the Harvard Management Company for clarity.

Harvard’s Asset Class for the Future

Asset Class 
Allocation 
Public equities 
14% 
Hedge funds 
32% 
Private equity 
39% 
Real estate 
5% 
Bonds/TIPs 
5% 
Other real assets* 
3% 
Cash 
3% 
ENDOWMENT* 
100% 
* Natural Resources, now under 1% of allocation, is included among 
Other Real Assets. 
** Rounding results in a total percentage greater than 100%.
Harvard Endowment Allocation.

Can you guess what might be the best performing asset class of the next 10 years?

I’ll give you a hint.

It’s already in a bull market and Harvard sold it all to buy more PE.

HMC’s asset allocation has featured three interrelated portfolio moves over the last seven years. First, we reduced the exposure to real estate and natural resources from 25% of the endowment portfolio in FY18 to 6% today. This strategic reduction has had apositive and compounding impact on the University’sendowment returns. It has also created room for the second major portfolio shift, which is our significant increase in private equities.

Natural Resources.

I’ve provided links below to the presentations from Stepstone, Bain and Equable. Plus, a fun one from KKR. Be a GP not an LP.

Have a good rest of the week.

Erik

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